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Abstract
Recent developments in differentially private (DP) machine learning and DP Bayesian
learning have enabled learning under strong privacy guarantees for the training data subjects.
In this paper, we further extend the applicability of DP Bayesian learning by presenting the
first general DP Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm whose privacy-guarantees
are not subject to unrealistic assumptions on Markov chain convergence and that is applica-
ble to posterior inference in arbitrary models. Our algorithm is based on a decomposition of
the Barker acceptance test that allows evaluating the Re´nyi DP privacy cost of the accept-
reject choice. We further show how to improve the DP guarantee through data subsampling
and approximate acceptance tests.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) [Dwork et al., 2006, Dwork and Roth, 2014] and its generalisations to
concentrated DP [Dwork and Rothblum, 2016, Bun and Steinke, 2016] and Re´nyi DP [Mironov,
2017] have recently emerged as the dominant framework for privacy-preserving machine learn-
ing. There are DP versions of many popular machine learning algorithms, including highly
popular and effective DP stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [Song et al., 2013] for optimisation-
based learning.
There has also been a fair amount of work in DP Bayesian machine learning, with the proposed
approaches falling to three main categories: i) DP perturbation of sufficient statistics for inference
in exponential family models [e.g. Zhang et al., 2016, Foulds et al., 2016, Park et al., 2016,
Bernstein and Sheldon, 2018], ii) gradient perturbation similar to DP SGD for stochastic
gradient Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and variational inference [e.g. Wang et al., 2015,
Ja¨lko¨ et al., 2017, Li et al., 2019], and iii) DP guarantees for sampling from the exact posterior
typically realised using MCMC [e.g. Dimitrakakis et al., 2014, Zhang et al., 2016, Geumlek
et al., 2017].
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None of these provide fully general solutions: i) sufficient statistic perturbation methods are
limited to a restricted set of models, ii) stochastic gradient methods lack theoretical convergence
guarantees and are limited to models with continuous variables, iii) posterior sampling methods
are applicable to general models, but the privacy is conditional on exact sampling from the
posterior, which is usually impossible to verify in practice.
In this paper, we present a new generic DP-MCMC method with strict, non-asymptotic privacy
guarantees that hold independently of the chain’s convergence. Our method is based on a recent
Barker acceptance test formulation [Seita et al., 2017].
1.1 Our contribution
We present the first general-purpose DP MCMC method with a DP guarantee under mild
assumptions on the target distribution. We mitigate the privacy loss induced by the basic method
through a subsampling-based approximation. We also improve on the existing method of Seita
et al. [2017] for subsampled MCMC, resulting in a significantly more accurate method for
correcting the subsampling induced noise distribution.
2 Background
2.1 Differential privacy
Definition 1 (Differential privacy). A randomized algorithm M : XN → I satisfies (, δ)
differential privacy, if for all adjacent datasets x,x′ ∈ XN and for all measurable I ⊂ I it holds
that
Pr(M(x) ∈ I) ≤ e Pr(M(x′) ∈ I) + δ. (1)
Adjacency here means that |x| = |x′|, and x differs from x′ by a single element, e.g. by a single
row corresponding to one individual’s data in a data matrix.
Recently Mironov [2017] proposed a Re´nyi divergence [Re´nyi, 1961] based relaxation for
differential privacy called Re´nyi differential privacy (RDP).
Definition 2 (Re´nyi divergence). Re´nyi divergence between two distributions P and Q defined
over I is defined as
Dα(P ||Q) = 1
α− 1 logEP
[(
p(X)
q(X)
)α−1]
. (2)
Definition 3 (Re´nyi differential privacy). A randomized algorithmM : XN → I is (α, )-RDP,
if for all adjacent datasets x,x′ it holds that
Dα(M(x) ||M(x′)) ≤  ∆= (α). (3)
Like DP, RDP has many useful properties such as invariance to post-processing. The main
advantage of RDP compared to DP is the theory providing tight bounds for doing adaptive
compositions, i.e., for combining the privacy losses from several possibly adaptive mechanisms
accessing the same data, and subsampling [Wang et al., 2019]. RDP guarantees can always
be converted to (, δ)-DP guarantees. These existing results are presented in detail in the
Supplement.
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2.2 Subsampled MCMC using Barker acceptance
The fundamental idea in standard MCMC methods [Brooks et al., 2011] is that a distribution pi(θ)
that can only be evaluated up to a normalising constant, is approximated by samples θ1, . . . , θt
drawn from a suitable Markov chain. Denoting the current parameter values by θ, the next value
is generated using a proposal θ′ drawn from a proposal distribution q(θ′|θ). An acceptance test
is used to determine if the chain should move to the proposed value or stay at the current one.
Denoting the acceptance probability by α(θ′, θ), a test that satisfies detailed balance
pi(θ)q(θ′|θ)α(θ′, θ) = pi(θ′)q(θ|θ′)α(θ, θ′) together with ergodicity of the chain are suffi-
cient conditions to guarantee asymptotic convergence to the correct invariant distribution pi(θ).
In Bayesian inference, we are typically interested in sampling from the posterior distribution,
i.e., pi(θ) ∝ p(x|θ)p(θ). However, it is computationally infeasible to use e.g. the standard
Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) test [Metropolis et al., 1953, Hastings, 1970] with large datasets,
since each iteration would require evaluating p(x|θ).
To solve this problem, Seita et al. [2017] formulate an approximate test that only uses a fraction
of the data at each iteration. In the rest of this Section we briefly rephrase their arguments most
relevant for our approach without too much details. A more in-depth treatment is then presented
in deriving DP MCMC in Section 3.
We start by assuming the data are exchangeable, so p(x|θ) = ∏xi∈x p(xi|θ). Let
∆(θ′, θ) =
∑
xi∈x
log
p(xi|θ′)
p(xi|θ) + log
p(θ′)q(θ|θ′)
p(θ)q(θ′|θ) , (4)
where we suppress the parameters for brevity in the following, and let Vlog ∼ Logistic(0, 1).
Instead of using the standard M-H acceptance probability min{exp(∆), 1}, Seita et al. [2017]
use a form of Barker acceptance test [Barker, 1965] to show that testing if
∆ + Vlog > 0 (5)
also satisfies detailed balance. To ease the computational burden, we now want to use only a
random subset S ⊂ x of size b instead of full data of size N to evaluate acceptance. Let
∆∗(θ′, θ) =
N
b
∑
xi∈S
log
p(xi|θ′)
p(xi|θ) + log
p(θ′)q(θ|θ′)
p(θ)q(θ′|θ) . (6)
Omitting the parameters again, ∆∗ is now an unbiased estimator for ∆, and assuming xi are iid
samples from the data distribution, ∆∗ has approximately normal distribution by the Central
Limit Theorem (CLT).
In order to have a test that approximates the exact full data test (5), we decompose the logistic
noise as Vlog ' Vnorm + Vcor, where Vnorm has a normal distribution and Vcor is a suitable
correction. Relying on the CLT and on this decomposition we write ∆∗ + Vcor ' ∆ + Vnorm +
Vcor ' ∆ + Vlog, so given the correction we can approximate the full data exact test using a
minibatch.
2.3 Tempering
When the sample size N is very large, one general problem in Bayesian inference is that the
posterior includes more and more details. This often leads to models that are much harder to
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interpret while only marginally more accurate than simpler models (see e.g. Miller and Dunson
2018). One way of addressing this issue is to scale the log-likelihood ratios in (4) and (6),
so instead of log p(xi|θ) we would have τ log p(xi|θ) with some τ. The effect of scaling with
0 < τ < 1 is then to spread the posterior mass more evenly. We will refer to this scaling as
tempering.
As an interesting theoretical justification for tempering, Miller and Dunson [2018] show a
relation between tempered likelihoods and modelling error. The main idea is to take the error
between the theoretical pure data and the actual observable data into account in the modelling.
Denote the observed data with lowercase and errorless random variables with uppercase letters,
and let R ∼ Exp(β). Then using empirical KL divergence as our modelling error estimator dN ,
instead of the standard posterior we are looking for the posterior conditional on the observed data
being close to the pure data, i.e., we want p(θ|dN(x1:N , X1:N) < R), which is called coarsened
posterior or c-posterior.
Miller and Dunson [2018] show that with these assumptions
p(θ|dN(x1:N , X1:N) < R) ∝∼ p(x|θ)ξNp(θ), (7)
where ∝∼ means approximately proportional to, and ξN = 1/(1 + N/β), i.e., a posterior with
tempered likelihoods can be interpreted as an approximate c-posterior.
3 Privacy-preserving MCMC
Our aim is to sample from the posterior distribution of the model parameters while ensuring
differential privacy. We start in Section 3.1 by formulating DP MCMC based on the exact full
data Barker acceptance presented in Section 2.2. To improve on this basic algorithm, we then
introduce subsampling in Section 3.2. The resulting DP subsampled MCMC algorithm has
significantly better privacy guarantees as well as computational requirements than the full data
version.
3.1 DP MCMC
To achieve privacy-preserving MCMC, we repurpose the decomposition idea mentioned in
Section 2.2 with subsampling, i.e., we decompose Vlog in the exact test (5) into normal and
correction variables. Noting that Vlog has variance pi2/3, fix 0 < C < pi2/3 a constant and write
Vlog ' N (0, C) + V (C)cor , (8)
where V (C)cor is the correction with variance pi2/3− C. Now testing if
N (∆, C) + V (C)cor > 0 (9)
is approximately equivalent to (5).
Since (8) holds exactly for no known distribution V (C)cor with an analytical expression, Seita et al.
[2017] construct an approximation by discretising the convolution implicit in (8), and turning the
problem into a ridge regression problem which can be solved easily. To achieve better privacy
we want to work with relatively large values of C for which the ridge regression based solution
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does not give a good approximation. Instead, we propose to use a Gaussian mixture model
approximation, which gives good empirical performance for larger C as well. The details of the
approximation with related discussion can be found in the Supplement.
In practice, if V (C)cor is an approximation, the stationary distribution of the chain might not be
the exact posterior. However, when the approximation (8) is good, the accept-reject decisions
are rarely affected and we can expect to stay close to the true posterior. Clearly, in the limit of
decreasing C we recover the exact test (5). We return to this topic in Section 3.2.
Considering privacy, on each MCMC iteration we access the data only through the log-likelihood
ratio ∆ in the test (9). To achieve RDP, we therefore need a bound for the Re´nyi divergence
between two GaussiansNx = N (∆x, C) andNx′ = N (∆x′ , C) corresponding to neighbouring
datasets x,x′. The following Lemma states the Re´nyi divergence between two Gaussians:
Lemma 1. Re´nyi divergence between two normalsN1 andN2 with parameters µ1, σ1 and µ2, σ2
respectively is
Dα(N1 || N2) = ln σ2
σ1
+
1
2(α− 1) ln
σ22
σ2α
+
α
2
(µ1 − µ2)2
σ2α
, (10)
where σ2α = ασ
2
2 + (1− α)σ21 .
Proof. See [Gil et al., 2013] Table 2.
Theorem 1. Assume either
| log p(xi | θ′)− log p(xi | θ)| ≤ B (11)
or
| log p(xi | θ)− log p(xj | θ)| ≤ B, (12)
for all xi, xj and for all θ, θ′. Releasing a result of the accept/reject decision from the test (9) is
(α, )-RDP with  = 2αB2/C.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1. See Supplement for further details.
Using the composition property of RDP (see Supplement), it is straightforward to get the
following Corollary for the whole chain:
Corollary 1. Releasing an MCMC chain of T iterations, where at each iteration the accept-
reject decision is done using the test (9), satisfies (α, ′)-RDP with ′ = T2αB2/C.
We can satisfy the condition (11) with sufficiently smooth likelihoods and a proposal distribution
with a bounded domain:
Lemma 2. Assuming the model log-likelihoods are L-Lipschitz over θ and the diameter of the
proposal distribution domain is bounded by dθ, LHS of (11) is bounded by Ldθ.
Proof.
|log p(xi | θ)− log p(xi | θ′)| ≤ L|θ − θ′| ≤ Ldθ. (13)
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Clearly, when Ldθ ≤ B we satisfy the condition in Equation (11).
For some models, using a proposal distribution with a bounded domain could affect the ergodicity
of the chain. Considering models that are not Lipschitz or using an unbounded proposal
distribution, we can also satisfy the boundedness condition (11) by clipping the log-likelihood
ratios to a suitable interval.
3.2 DP subsampled MCMC
In Section 3.1 we showed that we can release samples from the MCMC algorithm under privacy
guarantees. However, as already discussed, evaluating the log-likelihood ratios might require
too much computation with large datasets. Using the full dataset in the DP MCMC setting might
also be infeasible for privacy reasons: the noise variance C in Theorem 1 is upper-bounded by
the variance of the logistic random variable, and thus working under a strict privacy budget we
might be able to run the chain for only a few iterations before ′ in Corollary 1 exceeds our
budget. Using only a subsample S of the data at each MCMC iteration allows us to reduce not
only the computational cost but also the privacy cost through privacy amplification [Wang et al.,
2019].
As stated in Section 2.2, for the subsampled variant according to the CLT we have
∆∗ = ∆ + V˜norm, (14)
where V˜norm is approximately normal with some variance σ2∆∗ . Assuming
σ2∆∗ < C < pi
2/3 (15)
for some constant C, we now reformulate the decomposition (8) as
Vlog ' Vnorm + Vnc︸ ︷︷ ︸
∼N (0,C)
+ V (C)cor , (16)
where Vnorm ∼ N (0, σ2∆∗) and Vnc ∼ N (0, C − σ2∆∗). We can now write
∆∗ + Vnc + V (C)cor ' ∆ + Vnorm + Vnc + V (C)cor ' ∆ + Vlog, (17)
where the first approximation is justified by the CLT, and the second by the decomposition (16).
Therefore, testing if
N (∆∗, C − σ2∆∗) + V (C)cor > 0 (18)
approximates the exact full data test (5).
As in Section 3.1, the approximations used for arriving at the test (18) imply that the stationary
distribution of the chain need not be the exact posterior. However, we can expect to stay close
to the true posterior when the approximations are good, since the result only changes if the
binary accept-reject decision is affected. This is exemplified by the testing in Section 4 (see also
Seita et al. 2017). The quality of the first approximation in (17) depends on the batch size b,
which should not be too small. As for the second error source, as already noted in Section 3.1
we markedly improve on this with the GMM based approximation, and the resulting error is
typically very small (see Supplement). In some cases there are known theoretical upper bounds
for the total error w.r.t. the true posterior. These bounds are of limited practical value since
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they rely on assumptions that can be hard to meet in general, and we therefore defer them to the
Supplement.
For privacy, similarly as in Section 3.1, in (18) we need to access the data only for calculating
∆∗ + Vnc. Thus, it suffices to privately release a sample from NS = N (∆∗x, C − s2∆∗x), where
s2∆∗x denotes the sample variance when sampling from dataset x, i.e., we need to bound the Re´nyi
divergence between NS and NS′ . We use noise variance C = 2 in the following analysis.
Next, we will state our main theorem giving an explicit bound that can be used for calculating
the privacy loss for a single MCMC iteration with subsampling:
Theorem 2. Assuming
|log p(xi|θ′)− log p(xi|θ)| ≤
√
b
N
, (19)
α <
b
5
, (20)
where b is the size of the minibatch S and N is the dataset size, releasing a sample from NS
satisfies (α, )-RDP with
 =
5
2b
+
1
2(α− 1) ln
2b
b− 5α +
2α
b− 5α. (21)
Proof. The idea of the proof is straightforward: we need to find an upper bound for each of
the terms in Lemma 1, which can be done using standard techniques. Note that for C = 2 (19)
implies that the variance assumption (15) holds. See Supplement for the full derivation.
Using the composition [Mironov, 2017] and subsampling amplification [Wang et al., 2019]
properties of Re´nyi DP (see Supplement), we immediately get the following:
Corollary 2. Releasing a chain of T subsampled MCMC iterations with sampling ratio q, each
satisfying (α, (α))-RDP with (α) from Theorem 2, is (α, T ′)-RDP with
′ =
1
α− 1 log
(
1 + q2
(
α
2
)
min{4(e(2) − 1), 2e(2)}+ 2
α∑
j=3
qj
(
α
j
)
e(j−1)(j)
)
. (22)
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) illustrate how changing the parameters q and T in Corollary 2 will affect
the privacy budget of DP MCMC.
Similarly as in the full data case in Section 3.1, we can satisfy the condition (19) with sufficiently
smooth likelihoods or by clipping. Figure 1(c) shows how frequently we need to clip the
log-likelihood ratios to maintain the bound in (19) as a function of proposal variance using a
Gaussian mixture model problem defined in Section 4. Using smaller proposal variance will
result in smaller changes in the log-likelihoods between the previous and the proposed parameter
values, which entails fewer clipped values.
However, the bound in (19) gets tighter with increasing N . To counterbalance this, either the
proposals need to be closer to the current value (assuming suitably smooth log-likelihood),
resulting in a slower mixing chain, or b needs to increase, affecting privacy amplification. For
very large N we would therefore like to temper the log-likelihood ratios in a way that we
could use sufficiently small batches to benefit from privacy amplification, while still preserving
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Figure 1: Parameter effects. Calculating total privacy budget from Corollary 2 for different dataset sizes:
in Figure 1(a) as a function of subsampling ratio, and in Figure 1(b) as a function of number of iterations.
Figure 1(c) shows the proportion of clipped log-likelihood ratios as a function of proposal variance for
the GMM example detailed in Section 4.
sufficient amount of information from the likelihoods and reasonable mixing properties. Using
the c-posterior discussed in Section 2.3 with parameter β s.t. N0 = Nβ/(β + N), instead of
condition (19) we then require
|log p(xi|θ′)− log p(xi|θ)| ≤
√
b
N0
, (23)
which does not depend on N.
4 Experiments
In order to demonstrate our proposed method in practice, we use a simple 2-dimensional
Gaussian mixture model1, that has been used by Welling and Teh [2011] and Seita et al. [2017]
in the non-private setting:
θj ∼ N (0, σ2j , ), j = 1, 2 (24)
xi ∼ 0.5 · N (θ1, σ2x) + 0.5 · N (θ1 + θ2, σ2x), (25)
where σ21 = 10, σ
2
2 = 1, σ
2
x = 2. For the observed data, we use fixed parameter values θ = (0, 1).
Following Seita et al. [2017], we generate 106 samples from the model to use as training data.
We use b = 1000 for the minibatches, and adjust the temperature of the chain s.t. N0 = 100 in
(23). This corresponds to the temperature used by Seita et al. [2017] in their non-private test.
If we have absolutely no idea of a good initial range for the parameter values, especially in
higher dimensions the chain might waste the privacy budget in moving towards areas with higher
posterior probability. In such cases we might want to initialise the chain in at least somewhat
reasonable location, which will cost additional privacy. To simulate this effect, we use the
differentially private variational inference (DPVI) introduced by Ja¨lko¨ et al. [2017] with a small
privacy budget (0.21, 10−6) to find a rough estimate for the initial location.
As shown in Figure 2, the samples from the tempered chain with DP are nearly indistinguishable
from the samples drawn from the non-private tempered chain. Figure 3 illustrates how the
1The code for running all the experiments will be made freely available.
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accuracy is affected by privacy. Posterior means and variances are computed from the first t
iterations of the private chain alongside the privacy cost , which increases with t. The baseline
is given by a non-private chain after 5000 iterations. The plots show the mean and the standard
error of the mean over 20 runs.
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Figure 2: Results for the GMM experiment with tempered likelihoods: 2(a) shows 5000 samples from
the chain without privacy and 2(b) with privacy. The results with strict privacy are very close to the
non-private results.
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Figure 3: Intermediate private posterior statistics starting from iteration T = 1000 compared against
the baseline given by a non-private chain after 5000 iterations. Solid lines show the mean error between
20 runs of the algorithm with errorbars illustrating the standard error of the mean between the runs.
5 Related work
Bayesian posterior sampling under DP has been studied using several different approaches.
Dimitrakakis et al. [2014] note that drawing a single sample from the posterior distribution of a
model where the log-likelihood is Lipschitz or bounded yields a DP guarantee. The bound on 
can be strengthened by tempering the posterior by raising the likelihood to a power τ ∈ (0, 1) to
obtain the tempered posterior
piτ (θ) ∝ p(θ)p(x | θ)τ . (26)
The same principle is discussed and extended by Wang et al. [2015], Zhang et al. [2016] and
Dimitrakakis et al. [2017] in the classical DP setting and by Geumlek et al. [2017] in the RDP
setting. Wang et al. [2015] dub this the “one posterior sample” (OPS) mechanism. The main
limitation of all these methods is that the privacy guarantee is conditional on sampling from the
exact posterior, which is in most realistic cases impossible to verify.
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The other most widely used approach for DP Bayesian inference is perturbation of sufficient
statistics of an exponential family model using the Laplace mechanism. This straightforward
application of the Laplace mechanism was mentioned at least by Dwork and Smith [2009] and
has been widely applied since by several authors [e.g. Zhang et al., 2016, Foulds et al., 2016,
Park et al., 2016, Honkela et al., 2018, Bernstein and Sheldon, 2018]. In particular, Foulds et al.
[2016] show that the sufficient statistics perturbation is more efficient than OPS for models
where both are applicable. Furthermore, these methods can provide an unconditional privacy
guarantee. Many of the early methods ignore the Laplace noise injected for DP in the inference,
leading to potentially biased inference results. This weakness is addressed by Bernstein and
Sheldon [2018], who include the uncertainty arising from the injected noise in the modelling,
which improves especially the accuracy of posterior variances for models where this can be
done.
MCMC methods that use gradient information such as Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) and
various stochastic gradient MCMC methods have become popular recently. DP variants of these
were first proposed by Wang et al. [2015] and later refined by Li et al. [2019] to make use
of the moments accountant [Abadi et al., 2016]. The form of the privacy guarantee for these
methods is similar to that of our method: there is an unconditional guarantee for models with a
differentiable Lipschitz log-likelihood that weakens as more iterations are taken. Because of the
use of the gradients, these methods are limited to differentiable models and cannot be applied to
e.g. models with discrete variables.
Before Seita et al. [2017], the problem of MCMC without using the full data has been considered
by many authors (see Bardenet et al. 2017 for a recent literature survey). The methods most
closely related to ours are the ones by Korattikara et al. [2014] and Bardenet et al. [2014].
From our perspective, the main problem with these approaches is the adaptive batch size: the
algorithms may regularly need to use all observations on a single iteration [Seita et al., 2017],
which clashes with privacy amplification. Bardenet et al. [2017] have more recently proposed an
improved version of their previous technique alleviating the problem, but the batch sizes can
still be large for privacy amplification.
6 Discussion
While gradient-based samplers such as HMC are clearly dominant in the non-DP case, it is
unclear how useful they will be under DP. Straightforward stochastic gradient methods such
as stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics (SGLD) can be fast in initial convergence to a high
posterior density region, but it is not clear if they can explore that region more efficiently. HMC
does have a clear advantage at exploration, but Betancourt [2015] clearly demonstrates that
HMC is very sensitive to having very accurate gradients and therefore a naive DP HMC is
unlikely to perform well. We believe that using a gradient-based method such as DP variational
inference [Ja¨lko¨ et al., 2017] as an initialisation for the proposed method can yield overall a
very efficient sampler that can take advantage of the gradients in the initial convergence and
of MCMC in obtaining accurate posterior variances. Further work in benchmarking different
approaches over a number of models is needed, but it is beyond the scope of this work.
The proposed method allows for structurally new kind of assumptions to guarantee privacy
through forcing bounds on the proposal instead of or in addition to the likelihood. This opens
the door for a lot of optimisation in the design of the proposal. It is not obvious how the proposal
should be selected in order to maximise the amount of useful information obtained about the
10
posterior under the given privacy budget, when one has to balance between sampler acceptance
rate and autocorrelation as well as privacy. We leave this interesting question for future work.
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Supplement
A Useful differential privacy results
Proposition 1. A composition of two RDP algorithmsM1,M2 with RDP guarantees (α, 1)
and (α, 2), is (α, 1 + 2)-RDP.
Proof. See Mironov [2017, Proposition 1] .
The next result follows immediately from Proposition 1.
Corollary 3. Releasing a result from a T -fold composition of a (α, )-RDP query is (α, T )-
RDP.
The following Proposition states the privacy amplification via subsampling result of Wang et al.
[2019].
Proposition 2. A randomised algorithmM which accesses the whole dataset x only through
subset S of the dataset and satisfies (α, )-RDP w.r.t. to S, is (α, ′)-RDP with
′ ≤ 1
α− 1 log
(
1 + q2
(
α
2
)
·min
{
4(e(2) − 1), e(2) min
{
2, (e(∞)−1)2
}}
+
α∑
j=3
qj
(
α
j
)
e(j−1)(j) min
{
2, (e(∞) − 1)j}),
where q = |S|/|x|, and α ≥ 2 is an integer, and (∞) = limj→∞ (j).
Proof. See Wang et al. [2019, Theorem 10] .
Finally, we can convert RDP privacy guarantees back to (, δ)-DP guarantees using the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. An (α, )-RDP algorithmM also satisfies (′, δ)-DP for all 0 < δ < 1 with
′ = +
log(1/δ)
α− 1 . (27)
Proof. See Mironov [2017, Proposition 3] .
B Proof of main text’s Theorem 1
Denote the maximally different adjacent datasets by x1,x2. The mechanism releases a sam-
ple from N1 = N (∆1, C), and N2 = N (∆2, C), where ∆1,∆2 are calculated with x1,x2,
respectively.
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We want to show that
Dα(N1||N2) = log σ1
σ2
+
1
2(α− 1) log
σ22
ασ22 + (1− α)σ21
+
α
2
(µ1 − µ2)2
ασ22 + (1− α)σ21
(28)
≤ 2αB
2
C
(29)
assuming that either
| log p(xi|θ′)− log p(xi|θ)| < B ∀xi, θ, θ′ (30)
or
| log p(xi|θ)− log p(xj|θ)| < B, ∀xi, xj, θ. (31)
Proof. W.l.o.g., we can assume that the differing element between x1 and x2 is the final one, so
x1,i = x2,i, i = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Since σ21 = σ
2
2 = C, we immediately have
Dα(N1||N2) = log σ1
σ2
+
1
2(α− 1) log
σ22
ασ22 + (1− α)σ21
+
α
2
(µ1 − µ2)2
ασ22 + (1− α)σ21
(32)
=
α
2C
(µ1 − µ2)2 (33)
=
α
2C
[
N∑
i=1
log
p(x1,i|θ′)
p(x1,i|θ) −
N∑
i=1
log
p(x2,i|θ′)
p(x2,i|θ) ]
2 (34)
=
α
2C
∣∣∣∣log p(x1,N |θ′)p(x1,N |θ) − log p(x2,N |θ
′)
p(x2,N |θ)
∣∣∣∣2 . (35)
Assuming (30), and continuing from (35)
α
2C
∣∣∣∣log p(x1,N |θ′)p(x1,N |θ) − log p(x2,N |θ
′)
p(x2,N |θ)
∣∣∣∣2 (36)
≤ α
2C
( ∣∣∣∣log p(x1,N |θ′)p(x1,N |θ)
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣log p(x2,N |θ′)p(x2,N |θ)
∣∣∣∣ )2 (37)
≤ α
2C
|2B|2 (38)
≤ 2αB
2
C
. (39)
On the other hand, assuming (31), and again continuing from (35) gives
α
2C
∣∣∣∣log p(x1,N |θ′)p(x1,N |θ) − log p(x2,N |θ
′)
p(x2,N |θ)
∣∣∣∣2 (40)
=
α
2C
∣∣∣∣log p(x1,N |θ′)p(x2,N |θ′) − log p(x1,N |θ)p(x2,N |θ)
∣∣∣∣2 (41)
≤ α
2C
( ∣∣∣∣log p(x1,N |θ′)p(x2,N |θ′)
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣log p(x1,N |θ)p(x2,N |θ)
∣∣∣∣ )2 (42)
≤ α
2C
|2B|2 (43)
≤ 2αB
2
C
, (44)
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which is the same bound as before.
C Proof of main text’s Theorem 2
The Barker test amounts to checking the following condition:
∆∗ + Vnc + V (2)cor > 0, where (45)
∆∗ =
N
b
∑
i∈S
log
p(xi|θ′)
p(xi|θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ri
+ log
q(θ|θ′)p(θ)
q(θ′|θ)p(θ′) , (46)
Vnc ∼ N (0, 2− s2∆∗), (47)
N is the full dataset size, b is the batch size, s2∆∗ is the sample variance, and summation over S
here means summing over the elements in the batch, indexed by the element number i.
In other words, with a slight abuse of notation and writing capital letters for random variables
the mechanism releases a sample from
N (N r¯, 2− Var(N
b
∑
i∈S
Ri)) =N (N r¯, 2− N
2
b2
∑
i∈S
Var(R)) (48)
≈N (N r¯, 2− N
2
b
Var(r)), (49)
where (48) holds because Ri are conditionally iid with a common distribution written as R, and
Var(r) means the sample variance estimated from the actual iid sample ri, i ∈ S we have, i.e., a
vector of length b.
Assume that
|ri| ≤
√
b
N
∆
= c,∀ i and (50)
α <
b
5
. (51)
We want to show that
Dα(N1 || N2) = ln σ2
σ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
f1
+
1
2(α− 1) ln
σ22
ασ22 + (1− α)σ21︸ ︷︷ ︸
f2
+
α
2
(µ1 − µ2)2
ασ22 + (1− α)σ21︸ ︷︷ ︸
f3
(52)
≤ 5
2b
+
1
2(α− 1) ln
2b
b− 5α +
2α
b− 5α. (53)
Proof. As a first step, we have
0 < Var(r) =E(r2)− E(r)2 ≤ E(r2) = 1/b
∑
i∈S
r2i ≤
b
N2
(54)
⇒ 2− N
2
b
Var(r) ∈ [1, 2), (55)
16
where the last inequality in (54) follows from (50).
Denote the maximally different adjacent datasets as r1, r2 that produce draws from N1 and
N2 respectively, parameterised with means and variances as in (49). W.l.o.g., we can assume
that the differing element is the final one, so we have r1,i = r2,i, i = 1, . . . , b − 1. We write
i ∈ S \ xN to index a summation over the batch omitting the differing element.
The proof proceeds by bounding each of the terms f1, f2, f3 in (52).
To start with, f1 can be bounded as follows:
f1 =
1
2
ln
σ22
σ21
≤ 1
2
| ln σ
2
2
σ21
| ≤ 1
2
|σ22 − σ21| (56)
=
1
2
|2− N
2
b
Var(r2)− (2− N
2
b
Var(r1))| (57)
=
N2
2b
|1/b
∑
i∈S
r21,i − (r¯1)2 − 1/b
∑
i∈S
r22,i + (r¯2)
2| (58)
=
N2
2b
|1/b(r21,b − r22,b) + (1/b
∑
i∈S
r2,i)
2 − (1/b
∑
i∈S
r1,i)
2| (59)
=
N2
2b2
|(r21,b − r22,b) + 1/b(r22,b − r21,b + 2(
∑
i∈S\xN
r2,i · r2,b −
∑
i∈S\xN
r1,i · r1,b))| (60)
=
N2
2b2
|b− 1
b
(r21,b − r22,b)−
2
b
(
∑
i∈S\xN
ri)(r1,b − r2,b)| (61)
=
N2
2b3
|(b− 1)(r21,b − r22,b)− 2(
∑
i∈S\xN
ri)(r1,b − r2,b)| (62)
≤ N
2
2b3
[(b− 1)(c2) + 2(b− 1)c(2c)] (63)
=
N2
2b3
(b− 1)5c2 (64)
≤ 5
2b
, (65)
where the final inequality in (56) holds because we have (55), and (63) as well as the final bound
in (65) follow from (50).
For the common denominator term ασ22 + (1− α)σ21 in f2 and f3, we can first repeat essentially
the previous calculation to get
σ22 − σ21 ≥ −|σ22 − σ21| (66)
= · · · (67)
= −N
2
b3
|(b− 1)(r21,b − r22,b)− 2(
∑
i∈S\xN
ri)(r1,b − r2,b)| (68)
≥ −N
2
b3
[(b− 1)c2 + 2(b− 1)c(2c)] (69)
= −N
2
b3
(b− 1)5c2 (70)
≥ −5
b
. (71)
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Combining (71) and (55) we get
ασ22 + (1− α)σ21 = σ21 + α(σ22 − σ21) (72)
≥ 1− α5
b
> 0, (73)
where the final inequality follows from (51).
For the numerator in f3 we have
(µ1 − µ2)2 =
(
N
b
∑
i∈S
r1,i − N
b
∑
i∈S
r2,i
)2
(74)
=
(
N
b
(r1,b − r2,b)
)2
(75)
≤
(
2Nc
b
)2
(76)
≤ 4
b
. (77)
Finally, using the derived bounds in (65), (73), and (77) with the fact that σ22 ≤ 2 from (55), the
bound for the Re´nyi divergence (52) becomes
Dα(N1 || N2) ≤ 5
2b
+
1
2(α− 1)(ln 2− ln(1−
5α
b
)) +
α
2
4
b
1
1− 5α
b
(78)
≤ 5
2b
+
1
2(α− 1) ln
2b
b− 5α +
2α
b− 5α. (79)
If we instead use the tempered log-likelihoods with temperature τ = N0
N
, the effect is to replace
ri by τri. The same proof then holds when instead of N we write N0.
D Bounding the approximations errors
As mentioned in the main text, with finite data and b < N the acceptance test (18) in the main
text is an approximation. For this case, there are some known theoretical bounds for the errors
induced. The general idea with the following Theorems is that by bounding the errors induced
by each approximation step, we can find a bound on the error in the stationary distribution of the
approximate chain w.r.t. the exact posterior. The references in this Section mostly point to the
main text. The exceptions are obvious from the context.
First, Theorem 3 gives an upper bound for the error due to ∆∗ having approximately normal
instead of exactly normal distribution as in (46):
Theorem 3.
sup
y
|P(∆∗ < y)− Φ(y −∆
s∆∗
)| ≤ 6.4E[|Z|
3] + 2E[|Z|]√
b
,
where Z = N(log p(X|θ
′)
p(X|θ) − E[log p(X|θ
′)
p(X|θ) ]).
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Proof. See [Seita et al., 2017, Cor. 1] .
Next, we have a bound for the error in the test quantity (18) relative to the exact test (5) given in
Theorem 4. The original proof [Seita et al., 2017, Cor. 2] assumes that C = 1 and (16) holds
exactly. We present a slightly modified proof that holds for any C and also accounts for the error
due to having only an approximate correction to the logistic distribution. We start with a helpful
Lemma before the actual modified Theorem.
Lemma 3. Let P (x) and Q(x) be two CDFs satisfying supx |P (x)−Q(x)| ≤  with x in some
real range. Let R(y) be the density of another random variable Y . Let P ′ be the convolution
P ∗R and Q′ be the convolution Q∗R. Then P ′(z) (resp. Q′(z)) is the CDF of sum Z = X+Y
of independent random variables X with CDF P (x) (resp. Q(x)) and Y with density R(y).
Then
sup
x
|P ′(x)−Q′(x)| ≤ .
Proof. See [Seita et al., 2017, Lemma 4] .
Theorem 4. If supy |P(∆∗ < y) − Φ(y−∆s∆∗ )| ≤ 1(θ′, θ, b) and supy |S ′(y) − S(y)| ≤ 2, then
supy |P(∆∗ + Vnc + V (C)cor < y) − S(y − ∆)| ≤ 1(θ′, θ, b) + 2, where s∆∗ is the sample
standard deviation of ∆∗, S ′ is the cdf of the approximate logistic distribution produced by
N (0, C) + V (C)cor , and S is the exact logistic function.
Proof. As in the original proof [Seita et al., 2017, Cor. 2] the main idea is to use Lemma 3 two
times. First, take P (y) = P(∆∗ < y), Q(y) = Φ(y−∆
s∆∗
) and convolve with Vnc which has density
φ( x√
C−s2
∆∗ )
). For the second step, take the results P ′(y) = P(∆∗ + Vnc < y), Q′(y) = Φ(y−∆√C )
and convolve with the density of V (C)cor to get P ′′(y) = P(∆∗ + Vnc + V (C)cor < y), Q′′(y) =
S ′(y − ∆). By Lemma 3, both convolutions preserve the error bound 1(θ′, θ, b), and we
therefore have
sup
y
|P(∆∗ + Vnc + V (C)cor < y)− S(y −∆)| (80)
= sup
y
|P(∆∗ + Vnc + V (C)cor < y)− S ′(y −∆) + S ′(y −∆)− S(y −∆)| (81)
≤ sup
y
|P(∆∗ + Vnc + V (C)cor < y)− S ′(y −∆)|+ sup
y
|S ′(y)− S(y)| (82)
≤ 1(θ′, θ, b) + 2, (83)
where (82) follows from the triangle inequality.
Finally, a bound on the test error implies a bound for the stationary distribution of the Markov
chain relative to the true posterior, given in Theorem 5. Writing dv(P,Q) for the total variation
distance between distributions P and Q, T0 for the transition kernel of the exact Markov chain,
S0 for the exact posterior, and S for the stationary distribution of the approximate transition
kernel where  is the error in the acceptance test, we have:
Theorem 5. If T0 satisfies the contraction condition dv(PT0,S0) < ηdv(P,S0) for some con-
stant η ∈ [0, 1) and all probability distributions P , then
dv(S0,S) ≤ 
1− η ,
where  is the bound on the error in the acceptance test.
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Proof. See [Korattikara et al., 2014, Theorem 1] .
Generally, especially the contraction condition in Theorem 5 can be hard to meet: it can be
shown to hold e.g. for some Gibbs samplers (see e.g. Bre´maud 1999, Theorem 6.1) but it is not
usually valid for an arbitrary model, and even checking the condition might not be trivial.
E Numerical approximation of the correction distribution
As noted in the main text, we need to find an approximate distribution V (C)cor s.t.
Vlog
d
= N (0, C) + V (C)cor , (84)
where Vlog has a standard logistic distribution. The approximation method of Seita et al. [2017]
casts the problem into a ridge regression problem, which can be solved effectively. However,
nothing constrains the resulting function from having negative values. In order to use it as an
approximate pdf, Seita et al. [2017] set these to zeroes and note that as long as C is small enough,
such values are rare and hence do not affect the solution much. In practice, their solution seems
to work very well with small values of C, e.g. when C ≤ 1.
Since we want to use larger C for the privacy, we propose to approximate V (C)cor with a Gaussian
mixture model (GMM). Since the result is always a valid pdf, the problem of negative values
does not arise.
To find the correction pdf, denote the density of the GMM approximation with K components
by f˜cor, the GMM component parameters by pik, µk and σk, and the standard normal density by
φ. We have
flog(x) = (fnorm ∗ fcor)(x) ' (fnorm ∗ f˜cor)(x)
=
∫
R
fnorm(x)f˜cor(x− t)dt
=
∫
R
φ(
x√
C
)[
K∑
k=1
pikφ(
x− t− µk
σk
)]dt
=
K∑
k=1
pikφ(
x− µk√
C + σ2k
) = f˜
(C)
log (x; pik, µk, σk, k = 1, . . . , K)
As the logistic pdf is symmetric around zero, we require our GMM approximation to be
symmetric as well. We achieve this by creating a counterpart for each mixture component
with an opposite sign mean and identical variance and weight. To construct the approximation
on some interval [−a, a] ⊂ R, we discretise the interval into n points, and fit the GMM by
minimising the loss function
L(pi, µ, σ) = ‖flog − f˜ (C)log ‖2 (85)
calculated over the discretisation. Since GMM is a generative model, sampling from the
optimised approximation is easy.
Figure 4 shows the approximation error maxy |S ′(y) − S(y)|, where S ′ is the approximate
logistic ecdf and S the exact logistic cdf, due to V˜cor using the ridge regression solution proposed
20
by Seita et al. [2017] and the GMM. The error measure is the same as in Theorem 4 in the
Supplement. Empirically, as shown in the Figure, we can have noticeably better approximation
especially with larger C values.
1.0 1.5 1.75 2.0
C
10 3
10 2
10 1
m
ax
|S
'(y
)-S
(y
)|
Vcor + N(0, C) estimated with 105 samples
Ridge regression
GMM
Approximation error due to Vcor
Figure 4: Approximation error due to V˜cor with error bars showing the standard error of the mean
calculated from 20 runs. With the ridge regression solution proposed by Seita et al. [2017] the error
increases quickly when C > 1. Using the GMM approximation we can achieve significantly smaller error
with C = 2.
Figure 5 shows the two approximations with increasing C. When the negative values in the
ridge regression solution are projected to zeroes, the variance of Vcor increases and the resulting
approximate V˜log has variance much larger than the actual pi2/3 it should have. This also shows
in the resulting approximation. Figure 6 shows the empirical cdf for both approximations and
for the true logistic distribution, and the absolute distance between the approximations S ′ and
the true logistic cdf S.
To calculate the ridge regression solution for [−10, 10], we use the original code of Seita et al.
[2017] with parameter values n = 4000, λ = 10.0 used in the original paper. The problems with
larger C values persisted with other parameter settings we tested. Note that the discretisation
granularity parameter n used in the two methods are not directly comparable.
To fit the GMMs with K components, we take the interval [−10, 10] with n = 1000 points
for calculating the loss function, and run 20000 optimisation iterations with PyTorch [Paszke
et al., 2017]. We use Adam optimiser [Kingma and Ba, 2014] with learning rate η = 0.01 and
otherwise default settings. The approximation is forced to be symmetric about zero by adding
mirrored components: for the kth component we add a copy but set the mean as −µk, and set
the weights as pik/2 for both, i.e., use the mean of the original and the mirrored component. We
use K = 50 in the test, which gives 100 components with mirroring.
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C=1.0
C=1.501
C=1.75
10.0 7.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
C=1.999
Seita et al. approximate correction distribution log-pdfs with varying C
n=4000, =10.0
(a) Ridge regression results
C=1.0
C=1.5
C=1.75
10.0 7.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
C=2.0
GMM approximate correction distribution log-pdfs with varying C
n=1000
(b) GMM results
Figure 5: Approximate correction distribution log-densities with varying C values. Figure 5(a) shows
the results for the ridge regression solution used by Seita et al.: as C increases, the amount of negative
values that are projected to zeroes, which show as gaps in the log-pdf, increases markedly. Figure 5(b)
shows corresponding results for our GMM solution: the approximation is always a valid pdf over R.
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(a) Approximation ecdf and true logistic cdf
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Figure 6: Figure 6(a) shows the empirical cdf for the approximate logistic distributions calculated using
the ridge regression solution of Seita et al. and our GMM together with true logistic cdf. The variance
of Vcor using ridge regression is too high and the resulting Vcor +N (0, C) is clearly off. The ecdf for
GMM is almost indistinguishable from the true cdf. Figure 6(b) shows the absolute distances between the
approximation ecdf and the true logistic cdf.
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